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REMARKS

Attached is a copy of a memorandum that we sent to Mr. deGraffenreid yesterday in an attempt to get his attention to informally discuss the proposed NSDD to replace PD/NSC-24. We resorted to a memo after several attempts to get on his calendar last week. His secretary called this morning to advise us that he could see us tomorrow or Thursday. I do not know at this time whether we will meet with him or not prior to the Friday meeting of representatives from all Department/Agency heads that was requested in the covering memorandum for the proposed draft.

If you have any questions, please give me a call on Secure []

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Ken deGraffenraid
National Security Council

25X1
FROM:

[REDACTED]
Chief, Management and Liaison Staff, DDA/OC

SUBJECT: Draft National Policy on Telecommunications and
Automated Systems Security (C)

1. The responsibility for reviewing the subject proposed NSDD and representing the DCI at the February 17 meeting was delegated to the Director of Communications by the DDCI. We attempted but were unable to arrange an informal meeting with you to discuss areas of concern within the Agency which are:

a. The letter of transmittal from the NSC states that "it is intended that the machinery established by the NSDD would initially focus on those automated systems which are connected to telecommunications systems." The body of the proposed NSDD does not follow this statement of intent and is all inclusive for "automated information systems which create, prepare, or manipulate information in electronic form for purposes other than telecommunications, and includes computers, word processing systems and associated equipment." (emphasis added) (C)

b. The proposed NSDD does not accurately recognize the DCI's statutory responsibilities and authorities. Encroachments include: (1) the development of consolidated resources and budget which could both dilute the DCI's responsibilities regarding formulation of the NFIP and impact Intelligence Community priorities; (2) the proposed NSDD implies that the Director, NSA will take sole responsibility for assessing and disseminating hostile threat information, thereby removing related analytical missions of the CIA, FBI and DIA; and (3) a requirement that the DCI "coordinate unique requirements pertaining to the protection of intelligence sources and methods" with the Steering Group, the NTISSC and the Director, NSA. (C)

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WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
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SUBJECT: Draft National Policy on Telecommunications (C)

c. The missions and functions of the Interagency Committee on Foreign Real Estate Acquisition in the U.S. should be as stated in the original PD/NSC-24. (C)

d. There are a number of initiatives mandated by PD/NSC-24 that have not been completed for a number of reasons. The abrupt termination of these initiatives would countermand the thrust of PD/NSC-24 to eliminate the reliance on microwave and the vulnerability to intercept of telecommunications by an adversary. (C)

e. Under PD/NSC-24, there is an inter-agency mechanism for publishing coordinated national policy and standards. Under the proposed NSDD this responsibility is delegated to the Director, NSA, and there is no mechanism for coordination. (C)

2. Although there is philosophical agreement that separate NSDD's for computer security and for communications security might leave gaps in the protection of automated information systems as the technologies of the two disciplines' converge, we are concerned about the feasibility of managing a consolidated effort, particularly in view of the expanded scope of the proposed NSDD. We would prefer an NSDD that addresses the communications security issue only, with a separate or consolidated approach after the [redacted] panel completes their study. (C)

3. If you would like to discuss any of these points prior to the February 17 meeting, I can be reached on Secure [redacted]

[redacted]

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